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Abstract  
Whilst the literature on populism spans almost every conceivable discipline, the study of its 
relationship with religion remains exceptionally sparse. This paper seeks to fill an important 
gap in the literature and significantly enrich the study of populism by directly addressing the 
way in which religion impacts upon and is connected with populist movements. It does so by 
addressing a particularly illuminating case-study of populist attitudes towards Islamic law in 
Europe, namely the English public’s response towards the formation of Shariah tribunals. As 
this paper shall show, the populist depiction of Shariah tribunals forced the UK government to 
dramatically alter its stance towards such tribunals, by framing the formation of Shariah 
tribunals as a malign and subversive attempt by a religious fundamentalist lobby at annexing 
the jurisdiction of the state legal system and imposing religious law by stealth. 
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Accommodating Muslims and Islamic law is currently an issue which ranks highly on the 
agenda of policy makers in the Common Law world. England is an apt illustration in this 
regard.1 The year 2016 witnessed the launch of the first ever public review of Shariah tribunals 
conducted by the UK government, in response to populist concerns raised by the general public 
about the increasing numbers of such tribunals functioning within local communities.2 The 
review would have featured much more prominently in public discourse had it not been 
overshadowed by the UK’s decision to leave the European Union. Indeed, when Theresa May 
(as Home Secretary) announced towards the end of 2015 that the review would be taking place, 
her announcement made national headlines and reignited public debates about the future of 
Muslims and Islamic law in the UK. 
These debates have involved a diverse array of different actors including the media, politicians, 
pressure groups, think-tanks and lawyers (Grillo 2015). Within such debates, Shariah tribunals 
are often used as a focal point to address issues with much broader significance, such as 
immigration, radicalism and multiculturalism. The British public’s response towards the 
formation of Shariah tribunals thus represents a microcosm and ideal case-study of European 
populist attitudes currently adopted towards Islam, Islamic Law, and the migration of Muslims 
to Western countries. This paper will therefore critically assess and evaluate public responses 
to Shariah tribunals in the England in order to make an original contribution towards academic 
discourse about the role of religion in current trends towards populist politics.  
The paper begins by conceptualising populism as a socio-political phenomenon and examining 
the nature of the populism at play in British discourse on Shariah tribunals, followed by a brief 
socio-historical overview of the emergence, nature and role of Shariah Tribunals in England. 
This provides a conceptual framework for the subsequent analysis, which is divided into three 
main sections. The first section assesses the way in which the English courts have responded 
to the emergence of Shariah tribunals. The attitude of the courts is significant because it 
represents a marked diversion from the prevailing public attitude, which is the focus of the next 
section. This second section, which is the largest and most important of the three sections, 
critically analyses the sentiments of both the media and the general public towards the existence 
of Shariah tribunals. The final section assesses the approach of the UK government in this 
context and highlights the way it has dealt with populist attitudes towards Shariah tribunals.  
Populism and Religion 
 
In a seminal work which lays the foundations for understanding the socio-political 
phenomenon of populism, Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017, 1) describe the term as “one of the 
main political buzzwords of the 21st century.” The last few decades have seen a global surge in 
populist movements, with the ‘buzzword’ being ascribed to both left-wing and right-wing 
political parties across Europe, Latin America and the United States amongst other regions 
(Mudde 2007; Judis 2016). This surge has culminated in spectacular fashion with the recent 
vote by UK citizens to leave the European Union, and the election of Donald Trump as 
president of the United States (Bonikowski 2016; Gorski 2017).  
 
Despite the prominence of the term in public discourse, the correct way in which to 
conceptualise and approach populism as a phenomenon is contested by scholars in the 
academic literature. The Laclauan approach for example considers populism as an 
emancipatory political force which harnesses the power of marginalised segments of society in 
order to achieve radical democracy, and is prominent in political philosophy scholarship 
(Laclau 2005; Mouffe 2005; Burgos 2014). The socioeconomic approach on the other hand 
frames populism as a naïve economic programme of excessive redistribution of resources 
which inevitably leads to stringent financial adjustments with adverse social consequences 
(Sachs 1990; Dornbusch and Edwards 1991).  
 
Out of the diverse range of such approaches, this paper adopts the ideational approach 
advocated by leading authorities such as Mudde (2012), Kaltwasser (2012), Albertazzi (2015) 
and McDonnell (2015). The ideational approach defines populism as a thin-centred ideology 
which constitutes at its core a dichotomy between two antagonistic groups within society: the 
virtuous yet marginalised masses who represent ‘the people’, and a corrupt consortium of 
elitists who seek to protect and sustain selfish vested interests. Within this dichotomy, the 
closely-knit elitist group is depicted as the treacherous outsider who seeks to divest the 
sovereign populace of its cultural identity and ultimately inhibit its prosperity. 
 
The reason this approach is preferred is that it offers an illuminating insight into the populism 
at play in British public responses to Shariah tribunals. As this paper shall show, the populist 
depiction of Shariah tribunals forced the UK government to dramatically alter its stance 
towards such tribunals, by framing the formation of Shariah tribunals as a malign and 
subversive attempt by a religious fundamentalist lobby (‘the treacherous outsider’) at annexing 
the jurisdiction of the state legal system and imposing religious law by stealth. Of particular 
interest is the cultural identity of ‘the people’ which has been portrayed as being at stake in this 
discourse, namely a Hobbesian conception of the nation state which enjoys complete monopoly 
over the exercise of coercive legal power (Williams 2008; Helfand 2011).       
The ‘one law for all’ ideology embedded in this populist reaction towards the sudden 
emergence of privately administered religious tribunals can be better understood when framed 
within the wider historical framework of multiculturalism in human societies.  In pre-modern 
monarchies and empires, cultural communities were often recognized as bearers of collective 
rights and thus permitted in varying extents to follow their customs and practices as well as 
manage their own affairs (Kymlicka 1992; Smallwood 2001). Cultural diversity in the pre-
modern age was thus not perceived as a factor which necessarily undermined the unity and 
cohesiveness of society in any way, with majorities and minorities alike being seen as subjects 
of the monarch or emperor (Kasher 1985; Barkey and Gavrilis 2016). The modern nation-state 
however developed a very different conception of social organization, attaching great 
importance to physical territory. It only recognized the individual members of society as 
bearers of rights, and sought to create a unified legal, economic and political space for the 
whole of society, confined within a demarcated physical territory (Skinner 1978; Axtmann 
2004). This required it to dismantle long-established communities and reunite individuals on 
the basis of a homogenous culture. Identities such as religion, ethnicity and social status were 
all subdued under the dominating territorial or national identity (Reis 2004; Sandberg 2015). 
It is due to this historical process that the modern nation-state has sought to assimilate all 
individual members of society into the dominant homogenous culture so that they become 
citizens enjoying equal rights and incurring equal responsibilities within a unified political and 
legal sphere (Yilmaz 2000). This has made modern citizens so accustomed to equating social 
unity and equality with homogeneity and uniformity respectively, that they feel “morally and 
emotionally disorientated by, and do not quite know how to accommodate, the political 
demands of a deep and defiant diversity”, in sharp contrast to their pre-modern counterparts 
(Parekh 2000, 9). The particularly vivid presence of this moral and emotional disorientation in 
the British populist discourse on Shariah tribunals reveals a number of special factors that 
characterise religious issues and their relationship with populism, as shall be highlighted in 
more detail in the forthcoming analysis.  
Whilst the literature on populism spans almost every conceivable discipline, the study of its 
relationship with religion remains exceptionally sparse.3 This paper seeks to fill an important 
gap in the literature and significantly enrich the study of populism by directly addressing the 
way in which religion impacts upon and is connected with populist movements. It does so by 
addressing the particularly enlightening case-study of populist attitudes towards Islamic law in 
Europe in the shape of British public responses towards the formation of Shariah tribunals. 
  
A Brief Overview of the Emergence, Nature and Role of Shariah Tribunals 
The first Shariah tribunals in England emerged in the 1980s for a number of socio-historical 
reasons (Al-Astewani 2016; Bowen 2016). The first was a religious injunction in the Shariah 
for Muslims in a non-Muslim land to setup institutions that provide for the religious needs of 
the community.4 The urgency of this injunction was particularly felt by Muslim community 
leaders at the time due to the plight of numerous British Muslim women who were left chained 
in their marriages by husbands who refused to give them a religious divorce (Douglas et al 
2011; Bano 2012). Shariah tribunals were therefore setup to fulfil a Shariah injunction and 
more specifically to resolve the marital problems which British Muslim women were facing 
within the community by offering them a judicially-sanctioned religious divorce. More general 
reasons for the emergence of the tribunals include a trend of concentrated institutional activity 
within the Muslim community in the second half of the 20th century as well as the experience 
of British colonial rule in India during which Muslims were explicitly permitted to set up 
religious tribunals to deal with the very same issue of women in limping marriages (Ansari 
2004; Bowen 2011).5 
Although Shariah tribunals offer a number of religious services, the vast majority of their 
workload consists of issuing judicial divorce for Muslim women (Bano 2012). The Leyton 
Islamic Shariah Council for example, which is the oldest and most prominent Shariah tribunal 
in England, deals with approximately 600 divorce applications every year and has affirmed that 
95% of its cases deal with religious divorce (Al-Astewani 2016). Shariah tribunals view their 
role as complimenting the work done by the English courts and have reiterated their 
commitment to work within the parameters of the law (Bowen 2016). The vast majority prefer 
to rely on a voluntary jurisdiction when carrying out their work, but the Muslim Arbitration 
Tribunal is an exceptional example of a tribunal which makes ample use of Arbitration to 
resolve civil disputes between Muslim litigants (Choksi 2011; Broyde et al 2014). The exact 
number of Shariah tribunals which exist remains unknown, but a 2009 survey sponsored by the 
University of Reading managed to identified 30 tribunals whilst acknowledging that that this 
number was not definitive and that many smaller councils may have been missed by the survey 
(Bano 2012). 
Shariah Tribunals and the English Courts 
The first Shariah tribunals in England enjoyed a number of relatively quiet years after their 
initial formation. Very little attention was paid to them by media and the general public during 
their formative years of development. The little attention which they did receive in this early 
period came from the academic world, with a number of tentative studies appearing in the 
1990s which acknowledged their existence and sought to identify their precise nature and 
function.6 It was thus a momentous occasion when the Leyton Islamic Shariah Council received 
the direct attention of an English judge in the 1999 case of Al-Midani v Al-Midani.7 The tribunal 
in question had in this case issued a decision on the division and distribution of assets in an 
inheritance dispute between two Muslim parties, one of whom consequently decided to 
challenge the jurisdiction of the decision in the English courts. The case is significant in 
representing the first ever reported English case to consider the legal status of a decision issued 
by a British Shariah tribunal. Building upon the legal principles espoused in the 1965 case of 
Shahnaz,8 Justice Rix established that a decision of a Shariah tribunal will be given legal effect 
for the purposes of contract law if it relates to financial matters and both parties had consented 
to have their dispute resolved by the tribunal. He decided on the facts before him that the 
decision in this case had no legal effect because one of the parties had not consented to having 
the dispute adjudicated by the Shariah Council. In an enlightening and detailed exposition of 
the nature and function of the council, Justice Rix noted: 
The Shari'a Council was, as explained in its own brochure, established in 1982 by 
scholars representing a number of mosques in the UK…It would seem that Islamic 
divorce and matrimonial questions in general are the focus of its advisory and judicial 
work…It can grant Islamic divorce, but it emphasizes that such divorce nullifies only 
the Islamic marriage and has nothing to do with the civil contract…The bench of the 
Shari'a Council would seem to provide a welcome facility to the Muslim community 
of the UK to render decisions on Islamic law, particularly in the matrimonial and 
family sphere. Its authority appears to rest largely on consent, in as much as it responds 
to the needs of the community it serves.9  
The important precedent established by the case of Al-Midani was further developed by the 
more recent case of Uddin v Choudhury, which involved a financial dispute between two 
spouses who had their marriage dissolved by the Islamic Shariah Council at the request of the 
wife in 2004.10 On appeal, Lord Justice Mummery affirmed the ruling decided at first instance, 
stating that the marriage was “validly dissolved by decree of the Islamic Shariah Council” and 
thus activated the obligation of the husband to pay his wife the financial gifts which had been 
stipulated in the Islamic marriage contract:    
On this point it seems to me that…it was a valid marriage under Sharia law and that it 
was then validly dissolved by decree of the Islamic Sharia council. This was not a 
matter of English law. There was no ceremony which was recognised by English law, 
but it was a valid ceremony so far as the parties were agreed and it was valid for the 
purposes of giving legal effect to the agreement which had been made about gifts and 
dower. As a matter of contract, arising out of the agreement which the parties had 
made, I think that the judge was entitled in law to say that this was an enforceable 
agreement, and therefore he was right to grant judgment on the counterclaim.11 
 
Uddin is a landmark case in relation to the decisions of Shariah tribunals, as it confirms that 
English judges are willing to recognize an Islamic decree of divorce issued by a Shariah 
tribunal as having legal effect for the purposes of contract law.  
The responses of Justice Rix and Lord Justice Mummery are emblematic of the pragmatic and 
prudent approach of the English judiciary towards contentious cases involving law and religion. 
This approach is inspired by the liberal approach of English law towards religious groups, who 
are legally recognised as private organisations and permitted to engage in any activity as long 
as this does not violate the law.12 The sober and liberal response of the English courts towards 
Shariah tribunals is particularly noteworthy when the populist attitudes of media and the 
general public are taken into consideration. As we shall see, one of the key features of the 
populist discourse is the ‘one law for all’ mantra, in which Shariah tribunals are presented as a 
malicious subversive attempt at annexing the jurisdiction of the state courts. In stark defiance 
of this discourse, English judges have welcomed the contribution of religious tribunals who 
function within the parameters of the law, suggesting that they can positively complement the 
state judicial system by reducing the work-load of the over-burdened courts.13  
A jealously guarded constitutional principle of the English legal system is that the 
independence of judges is protected by law, and it is this independence which allows judges to 
speak their minds and refuse to be swayed by populist opinion or public pressure.14 This was 
most dramatically illustrated by the recent Brexit litigation, in which English judges held their 
ground despite the fierce propaganda campaign waged against them which included being 
labelled ‘enemies of the people’ (Mckee and Stuckler 2017; Clarke and Newman 2017; Freeden 
2017). Judges therefore form an important bulwark against the potential excesses of populist 
discourse, a fact which renders their independence a crucial asset of any legal system.  
Shariah Tribunals in the Public Spotlight  
It was not until the mid-2000s when Shariah tribunals suddenly began attracting substantial 
attention from the general public, over two decades since the first of such tribunals was formed. 
The major trigger for this sudden exposure was the discovery by The BBC in 2006 of an 
“unofficial Somali court” made up of “Muslim elders” (Grillo 2015, 22). This discovery stirred 
particular controversy because it was claimed that such a court was adjudicating in criminal 
matters, with one case specifically cited involving the stabbing of a Somali man. The BBC 
subsequently discovered the existence of a network of Shari’a councils in England, including 
the interesting case of the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal. This sudden exposure of Shariah 
tribunals to public scrutiny paved the way for a watershed moment in 2008 which came in the 
form of the Archbishop of Canterbury’s speech. The speech triggered an extraordinary media 
frenzy which brought the case of Shariah tribunals within full view of the general public and 
marked a turning point in their history. 
At the crux of the speech was the archbishop’s argument that Islamic law and Muslim religious 
tribunals should have a place in British society. Doing so would afford British Muslim citizens 
the dignity of choosing between activating the liberties afforded to them by the state or referring 
to religious tribunals in order to conform to their conscientious religious beliefs. The 
Archbishop however set an important qualification to this argument, namely that such religious 
tribunals should not be allowed to deprive members of the minority community from the 
liberties granted to them by the state.15 Overall, the Archbishop’s thesis was not farfetched or 
novel in its basic premises (Wilson 2010). Religious tribunals are not a novel phenomenon in 
the English legal system. Indeed, several religious communities in England have historically 
set up tribunals to serve the religious needs of their members with the full consent and authority 
of the law, including the Christian and Jewish communities.16 This is why the response to the 
speech was startling. As one commentator remarked, the speech sparked a “modern-day moral 
panic directed against Islam, British Muslims, and the Archbishop himself” (Bano 2008, 284). 
Media headlines reproduced the very stereotypes of Islam and Islamic law which the 
Archbishop bemoaned and tried to deconstruct in his speech (Chaplin 2008, 418). This 
sensationalist response was not only generated by the media but rather was also reinforced by 
senior politicians, echoing the responses espoused in the government’s backlash against 
multiculturalist policies towards the end of the 20th century (Sandberg 2015, 27).  
 
From this point onwards, Shariah tribunals became a regular cause of controversy and debate 
in the public arena. In 2009, a 127 page report was published by Civitas, a right-of-centre think-
tank based in London, which launched a stinging criticism of the practices and procedures of 
Shariah tribunals. The report noted that Muslim women could be forced to use the tribunals 
because of pressure from their families or the community, and that there was thus “a likelihood 
that some form of coercion exists to deprive them of rights that are due to them under British 
and European legislation” (MacEoin 2009, 46). The report also argued that the rulings of such 
tribunals, based as they were on Islamic law, were fundamentally incompatible with the values 
and principles of Western liberalism (MacEoin 2009, 40-47). It concluded that the tribunals 
were a “recipe for a dichotomous legal system that holds Muslims and non-Muslims to different 
standards” (MacEoin 2009, 73). 
A similarly critical report, titled “Sharia Law in Britain: A Threat to One Law for All and Equal 
Rights”, was published in 2010 by the public pressure group ‘One Law for All’ led by Maryam 
Namazie, an ex-Muslim secular activist. The main criticism raised in this report was once again 
the discriminatory attitude of the tribunals towards women as well as the pressure placed on 
such women to reconcile with abusive partners (Namazie 2010, 16). The report also 
emphasised the fundamental incompatibility between Islamic law as applied by Shariah 
tribunals and British legal values and principles (Namazie 2010, 18). A BBC Panorama 
programme was also broadcast in 2013 which investigated the way in which Shariah tribunals 
function.17 The episode concluded with concern that Muslim women were being pressurised 
by Shariah tribunals to remain in abusive marriages. Immediately after the Panorama was 
broadcast, an attempt was made to fire-bomb the Islamic Shariah Council’s building and the 
council also began receiving a large number of threatening letters and emails18 These incidents 
were a powerful indicator of the growing public resentment towards Shariah tribunals 
influenced both by Panorama and the previous accounts and reports exposing the controversial 
work of such tribunals from 2006 onwards.  
A more recent public controversy involving Shariah tribunals relates to the publication of a 
doctoral thesis by Machteld Zee, a Dutch legal scholar, titled “Choosing Shariah: 
Multiculturalism, Islamic Fundamentalism and Shariah Councils” (Zee 2016).  During a 
fieldwork trip in 2013, Zee visited several prominent Shariah tribunals including the Islamic 
Shariah Council, the Birmingham Central Mosque Shariah Council, and the Muslim 
Arbitration Tribunal. During this period she also undertook an internship at the Henry Jackson 
Society, a neoconservative British think tank based in London. Three years later, the Henry 
Jackson Society organised a debate in the House of Lords in which Zee’s research was 
officially presented to the public. Approximately one month before the debate, media were 
given an exclusive preview of Zee’s research. A public outcry ensued, not dissimilar to the 
outcry caused by the Archbishop’s speech, albeit on a smaller scale. The Independent for 
example featured Zee’s research on its front page, and described it elsewhere as “blistering” 
because it concluded that Shariah tribunals "all treat women as less than equal and are 
incompatible with human rights law”.19 Concern and alarm was expressed yet more vividly by 
other sections of the media.20 Most media attention was directed at the Islamic Shariah Council, 
which Zee had pinpointed in her book as the most dangerous and fundamentalist Shariah 
tribunal she had encountered (Zee 2016, 179). 
The Islamic Shariah Council meanwhile responded with shock and anger at the claims made 
by Zee and the reaction of the media. It issued a long and elaborate refutation of the claims 
made by Zee on its website, concluding that the research was “factually inaccurate, distorts 
case studies, makes wild accusations about individuals, misinterprets history, manipulates 
world events to conform to her agenda and is generally a huge farce.”21 The council also 
published on its website a complaint which it had lodged with The Independent’s complaints 
department regarding the paper’s report on Zee’s research, as well as announcing that it would 
be contacting Zee’s university to demand that the thesis be withdrawn.22  
Evaluating the Populist Response towards Shariah Tribunals 
The populist response to the emergence of Shariah tribunals in England has on the whole been 
one of concern and alarm rather than optimism and assurance, in marked contrast to the 
response of the English courts. Such a response can be explained from a socio-legal perspective 
by what Shachar has aptly described as the “paradox of multicultural vulnerability” (Shachar 
2001). This is the public concern that vulnerable group members within a cultural or religious 
group will be denied their citizenship rights when the state delegates self-governance powers 
to such a group (Shachar 1998). In the words of Shachar: 
When the state awards self-governance power over members' marriage and divorce affairs to 
identity groups, it enhances their autonomy. At the same time, this delegation of legal authority 
also exposes insiders who belong to traditionally subordinated classes, such as women, 
minorities within the group, and children, to what I call the paradox of multicultural 
vulnerability. These group members may accrue some benefit from the transfer of legal powers 
from the state to their identity groups, but as individuals with ``other'' identities they bear 
disproportionate costs for their group's nomos. (Shachar 1998, 289) 
This concern is particularly heightened when self-governance powers are awarded by the state 
to a communal group over marriage and divorce affairs, because the violation of citizenship 
rights, especially those of women, is systematic in such an area (Shachar 1998, 289). 
Shachar’s theoretical framework of multicultural vulnerability is extremely pertinent in 
explaining the case of populist concern about the self-governance powers and practices of 
Shariah tribunals. This is because the work of Shariah tribunals is predominantly in the field 
of marriage and divorce. As Shachar forecasts, the vulnerable ‘insider’ that is most affected by 
the existence of Shariah tribunals due to the nature of their work is the British Muslim woman. 
This explains why public concerns have been almost exclusively devoted to the way in which 
Shariah tribunals treat women, who are most in need of the services which Shariah tribunals 
provide. These particular concerns are further exacerbated by the manipulation of the 
‘oppressed Muslim woman’ stereotype as a cultural icon in populist policy discourses in order 
to frame particular social problems related to the Muslim community.23As Sandberg notes 
however, the excessively negative response of the media and the general public to the speech 
of the Archbishop suggests that the problem is also to do with religious tribunals in and of 
themselves (Sandberg 2015, 9). Simply mentioning a potential role for religious legal systems 
in today’s secularised society appears to be a regressive step and evokes images of draconian 
laws.24 This is because religion plays a much less important role in society than it once did 
(Sandberg 2014, 191).  
A change in public attitudes towards multiculturalism is also relevant in understanding the 
particular response towards Shariah tribunals. Since its adoption as a public policy, 
multiculturalism has received a growing tide of criticism that it is fostering fragmentation rather 
than integration (Modood 2013). A significant catalyst for this change in attitude has been the 
attempts by minority communities to implement religious law which have been described as a  
new form of multiculturalism (Reiss 2009; Baker 2012). This multiculturalism focuses on 
broader principles of group autonomy and self-governance in contrast to the ‘old 
multiculturalism’ which focused simply on principles of recognition and inclusion. This new 
form of multiculturalism  has fared much worse amongst policy makers and the general public 
than its former predecessor (Helfand 2011). The lack of enthusiasm for this new expression of 
multiculturalism can be understood in light of the prevailing modern conception of the nation-
state as an institution that monopolises legal authority for the greater good of society (Skinner 
1978; Yilmaz 2000; Parekh 2000). The prevalence of this conception in populist discourse was 
vividly portrayed by the ‘one law for all’ theme which prevailed in the critical reports on 
Shariah tribunals by both Namazie and MacEoin (MacEoin 2009: Namazie 2010).  
It is also important to note that the general disillusionment and anxiety about multiculturalism 
has been strongly linked specifically with the presence and activities of Muslims, particularly 
following the Rushdie Affair alongside the 2001 and 2005 bombings (Modood 2013). This has 
ranged from anxiety about the terrorist threat from radicalized members of the Muslim 
community to whether Muslims are committed to British values such as democracy, sexual 
equality and secularism (Ahmad and Modood 2007). Indeed when David Cameron declared in 
2011 that state multiculturalism had failed, he specifically linked the causes of this failure with 
the growth of Islamic extremism.25 This partly explains why Shariah tribunals only began to 
receive the critical attention of the general public in the mid-2000s, having enjoyed a very quiet 
period of existence since their formation in the 1980s. This also explains the focus in public 
responses on the incompatibility of Islamic law with Western values and norms, as well as the 
specific alarm caused by mention of the fact that some Shariah tribunals have dealt with 
criminal cases, since the Islamic criminal code is often highlighted in particular for its 
draconian nature.   
A key shortcoming in the populist response towards Shariah tribunals is the reliability and 
accuracy of the claims and accusations made against such tribunals. Notable examples of 
inaccurate claims which were constantly reproduced in the public debate include the assertion 
that “85 Shariah courts” exist in Britain (MacEoin 2009, 69) that Shariah councils charge 
different prices for men and women (Proudman 2012) and that the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal 
has several branches across the country (Bowen 2013).26 Very little effort is made to verify 
such claims before they are reproduced. As Grillo notes, “a striking feature of the Shari’a 
debate is the way that evidence about the councils is marshalled through frequently repeated 
and often poorly documented ‘cases’” (Grillo 2015, 32). 
An example of this phenomenon may be seen in the recent controversy involving Zee’s work. 
The Independent, one of the first papers to report on Zee’s research, described it as “the most 
detailed and informed analysis of the workings of British sharia courts ever undertaken by an 
independent researcher.”27 Consequent media reports and public responses simply accepted the 
claims of The Independent about the veracity of the research without any further investigation 
into the matter. No attention was paid to the fact that Zee had spent only two afternoons at the 
Islamic Shariah Council, meaning she could have only observed a maximum of eight cases.28 
John Bowen on the other hand, an American professor of anthropology who had reported a 
much more positive experience with the Islamic Shariah Council, had conducted fieldwork at 
the council over a span of eight months in 2010 during which he was able to analyse 200 cases, 
a fact which went unreported (Bowen 2011).  
The Henry Jackson Society’s promotion of Zee’s research despite its premature status also 
reveals a great deal about the role of think-tanks in shaping populist discourses about Islam and 
Muslims. Described as the “leading exponent of neo-conservatism in the UK” (Griffin 2015, 
5), the society effectively instigated the media saga on Zee’s research by giving her a platform 
in the House of Lords and completely overlooking the voices of well-established authorities in 
the field like John Bowen and Samia Bano. It is significant to note that the society has formal 
links with Civitas, the think-tank responsible for the publication of the “One Law for All” 
report in 2009, as well as Baroness Cox who has led a campaign in the House of Lords for 
limiting the jurisdiction of Shariah tribunals.29 
Public criticism of Shariah tribunals has also relied heavily on the testimonies of actual clients 
who have used such tribunals, which are often highly subjective. As Douglas states, 
“dissatisfaction with dispute resolution services, of any and all kinds, is as old as dispute 
resolution itself” (Douglas 2015, 62). Douglas draws interesting comparisons in this regard 
between critical remarks made about Shariah tribunals and those made regarding the civil court 
system, illustrating the striking parallels between the two sets of remarks (Douglas 2015). 
There is no doubt that Shariah tribunals do suffer from a number of flaws and shortcomings. 
Indeed Zee is simply one of a number of researchers who have raised concerns about the 
treatment of Shariah tribunals towards women. Zee’s findings join a body of testimonial 
evidence which has steadily been increasing over the last decade that gender discrimination 
does exist in the practices and procedures of Shariah tribunals.30  
What is required however is for these flaws and shortcomings to be placed in perspective, as 
Douglas suggests. Thus for example while many clients have reported negative experiences 
with Shariah tribunals, many others have reported positive experiences with such tribunals. 
After analysing the case-files of over 250 cases dealt with by the Muslim Law Shariah Council 
and interviewing several clients involved in these cases, Shah-Kazemi found in 2001 that the 
council offered Muslim women a much needed and empowering service: 
The action taken by these women illustrate the voluntary aspect of the process, because 
they choose to apply to the MSC: this clearly refutes the wide-spread secular 
assumption that educated and socially mobile women would be uninterested in 
asserting their rights within the framework of the Shariah. The fact that the MLSC 
insist in all their cases on communicating directly with the woman, even if she is not 
the one who first approaches the organisation, is distinctly to her advantage. It allows 
her to be independent from her family, and to a certain extent also saves her from the 
difficulties associated with unsuccessful negotiations…there are a number of women 
whose families are determinedly hostile to them and their needs, and for those women 
independent access to the MLSC is of critical importance, such access empowering 
them within the framework of their faith. (Shah-Kazemi 2001, 19-64) 
Shah-Kazemi’s findings illustrate the importance of placing client testimonies into perspective. 
One negative consequence of negligent reporting and unwarranted criticism in the public 
responses towards Shariah tribunals is that many such tribunals have developed an inherent 
suspicion of media and the general public. This has caused them to take extra caution when 
they are contacted for information and research purposes. When they do choose to respond, 
their responses can be very defensive and clearly fuelled by a feeling of being victimised and 
alienated. Bano has highlighted the caution and suspicion shown by Shariah tribunals in her 
report, noting in particular the impact of the Civitas report published in 2009: 
A number of council respondents were suspicious that the data collected would be used by the 
government to undermine the work of local community organisations and mosques. Some 
were concerned that participation might contribute to the stereotype that Shariah councils seek 
to replace civil law mechanisms for resolving matrimonial disputes and/or seek the wholesale 
introduction of Shariah law into English law (Bano 2012, 17) 
More accurate and even-handed reporting on Shariah tribunals would thus encourage Shariah 
tribunals to be more transparent about their work and engage with media and the general public 
in a more constructive and less defensive fashion.  
Shariah Tribunals and the UK Government 
The British government’s direct involvement in the issue of Shariah tribunals may be traced 
back to as early as 2006, when a question about such tribunals was posed in the House of Lords 
following the discovery by media of a ‘Somali court’. The media report stirred such 
controversy that Philip Davis, MP for the West Yorkshire town of Shipley, demanded that such 
bodies “should be closed down and a crime created for impersonating a court” (Grillo 2015, 
23). The government, however, maintained a more measured response. When asked in the 
House of Lords “whether they have made an assessment of the impact of the establishment of 
Sharia courts in the United Kingdom”, the government gave the following reply: 
Sharia law has no jurisdiction in England and Wales. There are, however, a number of 
Sharia councils in England and Wales that, on a private basis where the parties consent, 
deal with the mediation and resolution of personal and contractual disputes. These 
councils are not part of the court system. In all cases, parties will always have recourse 
to the UK courts.31 
 
This concise legal exposition of the status of Shariah tribunals mirrored the informed and 
temperate exposition espoused by Justice Rix in the 1999 case of Al-Midani v Al-Midani. Ever 
since this question was posed to the government, the issue of Shariah tribunals became a regular 
item on the parliamentary agenda. Whenever the issue has been brought up, the government 
has maintained a consistent position on the matter, stating that while such tribunals have no 
legal jurisdiction, the law does not prevent them from resolving communal disputes within a 
voluntary capacity. This reflects the government’s approach of religious tolerance which it has 
broadly maintained since the second-half of the 20th century (Modood 2013; Parekh 2000; 
Ahmad 2007). The most recently publicised position of the government on the matter was in 
response to an e-petition submitted during the 2010–2015 Conservative–Liberal Democrat 
coalition government, which  was titled “Ban all sharia law in the UK” and stated: 
This is to stop all 85 sharia courts that are open and to stop anymore from opening. 
People residing in this country should obey by British law. No other law should ever 
be used in this country not now and not ever. I want to see all sharia law banned and 
any one found performing these acts should be prosecuted by British law. 
By the deadline date of April 2014 the e-petition had received 21,452 signatures, and so 
qualified for a government response. Both the petition itself and the number of signatures it 
received are in and of themselves a further testimony to the current populist concern and alarm 
regarding the existence and activities of Shariah tribunals. The government responded by 
stating: 
Sharia 'law' has no jurisdiction in England and Wales and the Government has no 
intention to change this position. Sharia principles are the code of personal religious 
law governing the conduct of Muslims. They can extend into all aspects of people's 
lives, but provided an activity prescribed by Sharia principles does not contravene the 
law of England and Wales, there is nothing that prevents people living by Sharia 
principles. Britain has a proud tradition of religious tolerance, within the law.32 
 
The government’s affirmation that Muslims can live “by Sharia principles” is based on the 
traditional legal position in respect of religious individuals that they have the right to do 
whatever they like as long as this do not contravene an explicit provision of the law.33  The 
statement powerfully illustrates the importance and value which the government has 
traditionally attached to the principle of religious tolerance. It also aptly portrays the 
government’s liberal attitude towards Shariah tribunals which it has conventionally maintained 
since their formation.  
Bearing this context in mind, Theresa May’s announcement in 2015 that the government would 
be launching the first ever public review of Shariah tribunals signalled a dramatic alteration in 
attitude. The report itself is marked by a discernible change in tone, stating for example:   
Shari’a is being misused and applied in a way which is incompatible with the law… 
There is only one rule of law in our country, which provides rights and security for 
every citizen. We will never countenance allowing an alternative, informal system of 
law, informed by religious principles, to operate in competition with it.34  
 
The populist ‘one law for all’ undercurrents in this statement are unmistakeable, and illustrate 
the impact of the ever-growing populist sentiments directed against the existence and activities 
of Shariah tribunals. It was due to these overwhelming sentiments that the government finally 
felt it was obliged to acknowledge and appease public opinion by launching such a review.  
The government’s tone was maintained when the review was officially launched on 26 May 
2016, with the government announcing that the remit of the review would be to “examine the 
ways in which sharia may be being misused or exploited to discriminate against certain groups, 
undermine shared values and cause social harm.”35 Having taken almost two years to complete, 
the review was a major disappointment when it was finally published in February 2018. Rather 
than presenting a detailed examination of the “ways in which Sharia may be being misused” as 
per its original remit, the 39-page report dedicated a meagre 6 pages to the role and practices 
of Shariah councils which covered virtually no new ground that had not already been covered 
by previous research. The absence of a detailed empirical study of Shariah council processes 
consequently meant that the recommendations to the government that filled the remainder of 
the report were limited in value. To make matters worse, the most plausible and sensible 
recommendation of creating a body to facilitate official self-regulation of the councils was 
immediately shunned by the Home Office itself in a statement that simply rehearsed the 
traditional stance of the government: 
We will not be taking forward the review’s recommendation to regulate sharia 
councils. Sharia law has no jurisdiction in the UK and we would not facilitate or 
endorse regulation, which could present councils as an alternative to UK laws. In 
Britain, we have a long tradition of freedom of worship and religious tolerance, where 
many people of different faiths follow religious codes and practices, and benefit from 
their guidance. The government has no intention of changing this position.36 
 
This statement implies that the government had to a certain degree intended to carry out the 
review simply to appease populist concerns directed against the rise of Shariah tribunals. A 
noted objective of government inquiries acknowledged by public law scholars is to satisfy 
immediate public pressure related to a particular crisis while simultaneously deflecting short-
term scrutiny of the government (Leigh and Lustgarten 1996; Elliot and Thomas 2014). This 
objective was by and large achieved, with the Home Office promising that it would “carefully 
consider the review’s findings and other recommendations.”37 Shariah tribunals have since 
ceased to feature prominently in public discourse, with the spectre of Brexit instead taking 
centre-stage as the new craze of the populist movement. This in no way means that Shariah 
tribunals can once again feel at ease about their future presence. To the contrary, the Brexit 
process now provides the populist movement an ideal opportunity to lobby the government for 
tougher action on Shariah tribunals, including the foreseeable demand that they are banned for 
good.   
Conclusion 
For the first two decades following their formation, Shariah tribunals in England felt secure 
about their existence. In the first ever court-case directly affecting them, an English judge 
expressed positive sentiments about the complimentary services which they were providing to 
the Muslim community alongside the civil courts of the state. The government explicitly 
affirmed on numerous occasions that their presence and activities were legal and that they 
would be allowed to function based on the cherished British value of religious tolerance. The 
government’s resolve in maintaining this liberal attitude was acutely illustrated when a 
prominent member of the House of Lords, Baroness Cox, failed six times in a row to pass a 
private member’s bill which sought to limit the powers of Shariah tribunals (Al-Astewani 
2017).  
This secure position which the tribunals enjoyed was dealt a severe blow with the entry of the 
21st century, which marked a gradual change in populist attitudes towards Islamic law that has 
skyrocketed in recent years following the violent and horrific activities of the Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria (Davids 2015). Rising levels of public concern and alarm reached such an extent 
that the government was eventually forced to change its position and launch the first formal 
public review of Shariah tribunals. This move, along with the following decision of the 
government to leave the European Union, now raises serious question-marks about the future 
existence of British Shariah tribunals. This is an unfortunate development. As both the former 
Archbishop and the English courts have indicated, Shariah tribunals do have the capacity to 
positively compliment the state judicial system and offer an important service to British 
Muslim women suffering in limping marriages within an appropriate regulatory framework. 
The sudden transformation of the government’s attitude in the case of British Shariah tribunals 
represents an instructive microcosm of similar transformations occurring across Europe and 
the Western World in relation to the accommodation of Islam and Islamic law, raising much 
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